This Is Islam Uncovered

The Paradox of the Incomprehensible God

How Islam Describes What It Forbids

Introduction: The Central Claim of Incomprehensibility

Islamic theology makes a bold and absolute claim: Allah is beyond human comprehension. The Qur’an declares, “Vision perceives Him not, but He perceives [all] vision; and He is the Subtle, the Acquainted” (6:103), and, “There is nothing like unto Him” (42:11). These verses, among many others, communicate a radical transcendence: Allah is wholly other, utterly unlike creation, and inaccessible to human understanding.

At first glance, this claim appears to convey humility before the divine—a recognition that human language, logic, and perception are inadequate to grasp the infinite. Yet, when we examine the Qur’an and Islamic tradition, a striking tension emerges. The same sources that proclaim Allah’s incomprehensibility proceed to catalog His attributes in meticulous detail: He is merciful, just, wrathful, powerful, all-seeing, and even anthropomorphically described with “hands,” a “face,” and a “throne.”

This essay systematically examines this paradox. How can a being who is supposedly beyond comprehension be described in such detail? How did classical and later Islamic theologians attempt to reconcile this tension? And what are the logical consequences of affirming both total incomprehensibility and detailed description simultaneously?

I. Qur’anic Foundations: Allah Beyond Human Grasp

The Qur’an is unambiguous in asserting Allah’s radical otherness. Several key verses set the framework for the claim of incomprehensibility:

6:103 – “Vision perceives Him not, but He perceives [all] vision; and He is the Subtle, the Acquainted.”
42:11 – “There is nothing like unto Him, and He is the Hearing, the Seeing.”
7:143 – The story of Moses requesting to see God, only to witness a mountain crumbling and himself fainting, symbolizes human incapacity to directly perceive Allah.
50:16–17 – Emphasizes omnipresence and omniscience, stating that Allah is closer to humans than their jugular vein, yet this knowledge is still not fully graspable.

From these texts, two claims emerge:

Perceptual Inaccessibility – Humans cannot see or fully perceive Allah.
Ontological Uniqueness – No likeness exists; Allah’s essence defies all human categories.

The implication is clear: any attempt to conceptualize or describe Allah risks anthropomorphism or error. If humans cannot fully perceive Allah, then any description is necessarily incomplete or metaphorical.

II. The Explosion of Attributes: The 99 Names of Allah and Qur’anic Descriptions

Despite these claims of incomprehensibility, Islam elaborates an extensive catalogue of divine attributes. The 99 Names of Allah (al-asmāʾ al-ḥusnā) provide a prime example:

Ar-Raḥmān (The Most Merciful)
Al-‘Adl (The Just)
Al-Muntaqim (The Avenger)
Al-Wadūd (The Loving)
Al-Qahhār (The All-Subduer)

The Qur’an itself frequently attributes actions and qualities to Allah:

Creation – 2:117, 35:1
Guidance and Misguidance – 3:54, 6:125
Forgiveness and Punishment – 39:53, 2:161
Anthropomorphic Imagery – “Hand” (48:10), “Face” (55:27), “Throne” (20:5)

Beyond the Qur’an, classical theologians elaborated eternal attributes (ṣifāt), typically divided into:

Essential Attributes (dhātīya) – Life, knowledge, power, will, hearing, sight, speech.
Action Attributes (fi‘liya) – Creation, provision, guidance, punishment.

Through this framework, Allah is no longer a vague ineffable entity. He is richly described, with moral, cognitive, and even quasi-physical attributes.

III. Classical Theological Attempts to Reconcile the Paradox

Faced with the tension between radical incomprehensibility and detailed description, Islamic theologians developed several strategies.

1. Bi-lā Kayf (“Without asking how”)

The Hanbali tradition, notably Ahmad ibn Hanbal, affirmed anthropomorphic statements literally but rejected inquiries into their modality. For instance, when the Qur’an states that Allah has a “hand” (48:10), believers are to affirm it without asking how (bi-lā kayf).

Purpose: To preserve scriptural literalism while avoiding the risk of anthropomorphism.
Problem: It allows affirmation without understanding, but the act of affirmation implies comprehension at some level. To assert “Allah has a hand, but we do not know what it is” is logically incoherent: one must grasp some sense of the term to affirm it.

2. Tanzīh (Absolute Transcendence)

Scholars repeatedly stressed Allah’s attributes must not resemble creation. He “sees,” but not with eyes; “speaks,” but not with vocal cords.

Purpose: Maintain Allah’s transcendence and preserve the claim of incomprehensibility.
Problem: Language is inherently relational. Words like “seeing” or “speaking” derive their meaning from human experience. Stripping them of their analogical content renders them semantically empty. The more one emphasizes incomparability, the less the descriptive vocabulary communicates.

3. Metaphorical Interpretation (Taʾwīl)

Rationalist schools, like the Mu‘tazila and later Ash‘arites, argued that anthropomorphic verses must be read metaphorically:

“Hand” = power or authority
“Throne” = dominion
“Face” = essence or presence

This preserves transcendence while enabling some intelligible understanding. Yet it risks reducing the Qur’an to figurative language, undermining claims of literal divine revelation. Literalists rejected this, accusing rationalists of denying God’s revealed words.

4. Mystical Approach (Sufism)

Sufi thinkers posited that Allah’s attributes are “signs” (ayat) for human reflection. Humans encounter these attributes as manifestations of divine reality but never grasp Allah’s essence.

Example: Ibn Arabi’s al-Futūḥāt al-Makkiyya emphasizes experiential knowledge of Allah through His names without claiming comprehension of His essence.
Problem: This approach is inherently subjective, depending on spiritual experience rather than logical or textual consistency. It also undermines Qur’anic clarity, turning Allah into an amorphous mystical presence.

IV. The Logical Contradiction

The tension between incomprehensibility and detailed description is not merely philosophical—it is logically unavoidable:

Claim: Allah is utterly beyond comprehension.
Counter-Claim: Allah is described in detail through names, actions, and anthropomorphic imagery.

These claims cannot coexist without contradiction. To describe is already to comprehend at some level. To deny comprehension while affirming descriptions is a self-contradiction.

Even classical Islamic theology implicitly admits this tension. The distinction between essence (dhāt) and attributes (ṣifāt) is an attempt to preserve both claims:

Essence = unknowable
Attributes = knowable only insofar as revealed

Yet this distinction does not solve the problem. Any description of attributes necessarily communicates something about essence. Affirming attributes while claiming total ignorance of essence is logically fragile.

V. The Circular Trap of Bi-lā Kayf

The formula bi-lā kayf epitomizes this paradox. It instructs:

Affirm Allah has a “hand” (or throne, face, etc.).
Do not ask how.

Two problems arise:

If the term “hand” conveys no human meaning, it communicates nothing.
If it conveys meaning, then Allah is at least partly comprehensible.

Thus, the formula simultaneously affirms and denies knowledge, creating a circular logic that is unsustainable.

VI. Historical Case Studies: The Clash of Schools

1. Hanbali Literalists vs. Rationalists

Ahmad ibn Hanbal’s literalism affirmed anthropomorphic attributes without asking how.
Rationalists (Mu‘tazila) argued that such descriptions must be metaphorical to preserve divine unity and transcendence.

This conflict led to centuries of theological polemics, reflecting the impossibility of satisfying both literalist and rationalist claims.

2. Ash‘ari Synthesis

The Ash‘ari school attempted a middle ground: affirm attributes without likening them to creation (tafwīḍ). This strategy was internally inconsistent, as it affirmed meanings that were intentionally undefined, leaving the believer in epistemic limbo.

3. Sufi Mysticism

Sufis like Ibn Arabi emphasized experiential knowledge over literal or rationalist analysis. This approach resolves the paradox subjectively but at the expense of scriptural literalism and scholastic rigor.

VII. Modern Implications

The paradox continues to affect contemporary Islamic thought:

Literalist Revivalism – Groups like Salafis insist on literal affirmation, reintroducing tension between incomprehensibility and anthropomorphism.
Reformist Approaches – Modern rationalist scholars interpret attributes metaphorically, appealing to reason but facing accusations of heresy.
Cognitive Dissonance – Believers are often instructed to affirm detailed attributes while simultaneously being told not to question them, producing persistent confusion and reliance on authoritative interpretation rather than independent reasoning.

VIII. Consequences for Coherence

The self-contradiction undermines Islam’s claims of logical and theological consistency:

Semantic Emptiness – Attributes like “hand” or “throne” either mean what humans understand (compromising transcendence) or mean nothing (communicating nothing).
Theological Instability – Centuries of sectarian disputes demonstrate the impossibility of coherently reconciling literal description and incomprehensibility.
Anthropomorphic Projection – Despite disclaimers, Allah resembles an amplified human ruler: enthroned, wrathful, merciful, deceiving, and guiding.
Erosion of Scriptural Clarity – Metaphorical or mystical interpretations undermine claims of clear revelation.

IX. Conclusion: Describing the Indescribable

Islamic theology simultaneously asserts Allah is utterly beyond comprehension and meticulously described in human terms. Classical and modern attempts—bi-lā kayf, tanzīh, ta’wīl, and Sufi mystical experience—do not resolve the tension; they merely obscure it.

The result is a profound internal contradiction: a God who cannot be grasped is nonetheless catalogued in human language; a being who is ineffable is described in exhaustive detail. This is not divine mystery—it is logical incoherence.

To describe what one insists is beyond description is not reverence; it is a contradiction embedded at the very heart of Islamic theology. The more Islam elaborates on Allah’s attributes, the less plausible the claim of incomprehensibility becomes. Conversely, the more one insists on incomprehensibility, the less meaningful any description is. The two claims cannot coexist coherently, yet they persist in Islamic thought, producing centuries of theological contortions, internal debate, and enduring conceptual confusion.