This Is Islam Uncovered

The Universal Islamic Declaration of Human Rights (1981):

A Deep Analysis of Its Origins, Content, and Contradictions

Introduction

In 1948, the United Nations adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) as a milestone in the recognition of human dignity and freedom across all nations, faiths, and cultures. Rooted in the principle of universality, the UDHR enshrined rights that belong to all individuals simply by virtue of being human. Its emphasis on equality, freedom of conscience, and protections against tyranny stood as a global consensus against the horrors of fascism, colonialism, and world war.

Yet the UDHR did not pass uncontested. From its inception, some states and religious traditions wrestled with its claims to universality. Among them, Islamic thinkers and governments expressed ambivalence: while many Muslim-majority states supported the UDHR, they often emphasized the primacy of Islamic law (Shari’ah) as the ultimate standard of justice. This tension—between universalist human rights and Islamic exceptionalism—eventually produced a parallel rights discourse in the Muslim world.

The Universal Islamic Declaration of Human Rights (UIDHR), adopted in 1981 by the Islamic Council of Europe, was one of the first formal attempts to articulate a human rights framework explicitly rooted in Islam. It preceded the better-known Cairo Declaration of Human Rights in Islam (CDHRI) of 1990, which was adopted by the Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC, now OIC). While the Cairo Declaration became the official Islamic alternative to the UDHR, the UIDHR remains significant as an intellectual and ideological precursor.

At first glance, the UIDHR appears to affirm the same rights enshrined in the UDHR: life, liberty, equality, dignity, and justice. Yet a close reading reveals that every right is defined and limited not by human dignity, but by Shari’ah law. The declaration speaks the language of universality but undermines it by imposing a religious filter. Rights are not unconditional; they are contingent upon obedience to divine law as interpreted by Islamic jurists.

This essay offers a comprehensive, critical examination of the UIDHR, structured into the following sections:

Historical Context: Why the UIDHR was written, and how it fits into broader global debates on human rights.
Foundational Premises: The theological and philosophical assumptions behind the UIDHR.
Comparisons with the UDHR: Areas of overlap and divergence.
Content Analysis: Article-by-article evaluation, highlighting strengths, contradictions, and conditionalities.
Case Studies: How Shari’ah-based states have applied similar principles in practice.
The Strategic Function of the UIDHR: How it positions Islam in relation to the West and to international law.
Philosophical Clash: Universality versus religious conditionality.
Critical Weaknesses and Contradictions.
Conclusion: Why the UIDHR matters and what it reveals about the future of human rights discourse in the Islamic world.

1. Historical Context

The Birth of the UDHR and Global Universality

The UDHR (1948) was drafted after World War II as a universal response to tyranny and genocide. It sought to establish a global baseline for rights—freedom of religion, freedom of expression, equality before the law, and protection from arbitrary power. Though influenced by Western liberal traditions, its drafting included representatives from across cultures and religions, including several Muslim-majority states.

Notably, most Islamic countries voted in favor of the UDHR—except Saudi Arabia, which abstained, citing objections to provisions on freedom of religion (Article 18) and marriage rights (Article 16). Saudi representatives argued that the UDHR conflicted with Shari’ah, particularly on issues of apostasy, conversion, and gender equality.

The Islamic Resurgence and Human Rights Discourse

By the 1970s, a wave of Islamic revivalism swept across the Muslim world. The 1979 Iranian Revolution, the rise of political Islam, and the growing influence of Saudi-funded institutions placed Shari’ah at the center of Muslim identity politics. In this climate, Islamic thinkers sought to assert that Islam not only provided rights but did so in a way superior to Western secularism.

The UIDHR of 1981

In 1981, the Islamic Council of Europe, a non-governmental body comprised of Muslim scholars, jurists, and intellectuals (many based in the West), produced the Universal Islamic Declaration of Human Rights (UIDHR). It was adopted in London on September 19, 1981, in the presence of diplomats and religious figures.

The UIDHR was not a binding treaty, nor did it have the endorsement of the OIC. Rather, it functioned as an intellectual manifesto, showcasing how Islam could be presented as compatible with the global human rights movement while remaining faithful to Shari’ah.

It foreshadowed the Cairo Declaration of 1990, which was much firmer in asserting Shari’ah supremacy. Where the UIDHR sought to sound conciliatory, the Cairo Declaration drew a harder line.

2. Foundational Premises of the UIDHR

The UIDHR is built on several axioms that fundamentally distinguish it from the UDHR:

Divine Sovereignty: All rights come from God, not from human reason or consensus.
Primacy of Duties over Rights: Duties are emphasized first, rights only exist insofar as duties are upheld.
Shari’ah as the Sole Standard: Rights are defined and limited by Islamic law, not by secular law or international treaties.
Rejection of Secular Rationalism: The declaration asserts that human reason without revelation is insufficient to guarantee rights.
Communal Identity: The Ummah (Islamic community) frames rights, rather than the individual as in the UDHR.

These premises reflect a fundamentally different philosophical anthropology: in Islam, the individual’s dignity derives from obedience to God, whereas in the UDHR, dignity derives from being human.

3. UIDHR versus UDHR: Areas of Overlap and Divergence

Overlap

The UIDHR echoes many of the UDHR’s provisions:

Right to life (UIDHR I ↔ UDHR Article 3).
Equality (UIDHR III ↔ UDHR Article 2).
Prohibition of torture (UIDHR V ↔ UDHR Article 5).
Fair trial (UIDHR VI ↔ UDHR Article 10).
Education, healthcare, and work (UIDHR XV–XVII ↔ UDHR Articles 23–26).

This rhetorical overlap allows Islamic scholars to argue that Islam has always recognized rights similar to modern norms.

Divergence

Yet the differences are crucial:

Freedom of religion: UDHR guarantees the right to change one’s religion (Article 18); UIDHR explicitly excludes apostasy.
Gender equality: UDHR demands full equality; UIDHR couches equality in “complementary roles,” preserving Shari’ah distinctions.
Freedom of expression: UDHR permits criticism of all beliefs; UIDHR forbids speech that undermines faith or public morality.
Universality: UDHR rights apply to all humans equally; UIDHR rights apply only within the bounds of Shari’ah.

4. Content Analysis: Article by Article

Below is a breakdown of key UIDHR provisions and their implications:

Article I: Right to Life

Affirms sanctity of life, prohibition of arbitrary killing. However, Shari’ah allows death for apostasy, adultery, and blasphemy. Thus, “right to life” is conditional.

Article II: Right to Freedom

Asserts freedom from oppression. Yet since Shari’ah is the ultimate measure, any action deemed against Shari’ah (e.g., secularism, homosexuality, criticism of Islam) can be treated as “oppression” against Islam itself.

Article III: Right to Equality and Prohibition of Discrimination

Promises equality regardless of race, sex, or creed. But in practice, Shari’ah enforces gender hierarchy (inheritance, testimony, marriage) and non-Muslim subordination (jizya tax, restrictions on leadership).

Article V–VII: Justice, Torture, and Fair Trial

Progressive on paper. But Shari’ah trials often fail modern standards of fairness (e.g., reliance on male Muslim witnesses, corporal punishments).

Article VIII: Protection of Honour and Reputation

Protects against defamation. However, in Islamic states, this provision often morphs into blasphemy laws, criminalizing criticism of religion.

Article XII–XIII: Freedom of Belief, Thought, and Religion

Restricted by Shari’ah. Apostasy forbidden; freedom of conscience curtailed. Non-Muslims may practice religion but within limits.

Article XV–XVIII: Socio-Economic Rights

Mirrors UDHR—right to work, education, social security. These align closely with Islamic traditions of welfare (zakat, sadaqah).

Article XX: Women’s Rights

Affirms rights in principle but ties them to Shari’ah-defined roles. Wives are guaranteed maintenance by husbands, but husbands retain authority.

Article XXII: Freedom of Association

Permitted, but restricted to lawful (i.e., Islamic) causes.

Article XXIII: Freedom of Movement

Recognized, but historically limited for non-Muslims or women traveling without guardians.

5. Case Studies: How UIDHR Principles Play Out

Saudi Arabia

No constitution other than the Qur’an and Sunnah.
Rights are entirely conditional on Shari’ah.
Freedom of religion excluded: churches and temples forbidden.
Apostasy punishable by death.

Iran

Islamic Republic founded in 1979, constitution explicitly subjects all laws to Shari’ah.
Rights of expression curtailed by blasphemy and “propaganda against the state” laws.
Women’s testimony worth half a man’s; unequal inheritance persists.

Pakistan

Blasphemy laws (295–298 of Penal Code) derive legitimacy from Shari’ah principles.
Christians and Ahmadis face persecution despite nominal guarantees of equality.

These states reflect how the conditionalities of UIDHR translate into systemic restrictions on freedom and equality.

6. The Strategic Function of the UIDHR

The UIDHR was a strategic document with dual audiences:

External (International): To show that Islam is compatible with human rights discourse. By echoing UDHR language, it sought legitimacy.
Internal (Islamic world): To assert Shari’ah supremacy and counter secular influences. It reinforced the idea that human rights are legitimate only when rooted in Islam.

In this sense, it functioned as a bridge document—a halfway point between the conciliatory universalism of the UDHR and the harder exclusivism of the Cairo Declaration (1990).

7. Philosophical Clash: Universality versus Conditionality

At the heart of the conflict lies a philosophical clash:

UDHR: Human dignity is inherent, unconditional, and universal. Rights exist prior to any legal system.
UIDHR: Human dignity is contingent on obedience to God’s law. Rights do not exist apart from Shari’ah.

This is not a minor disagreement—it is a foundational contradiction. One framework is secular and universalist; the other is religious and conditional. The two cannot be reconciled without one subsuming the other.

8. Critical Weaknesses of the UIDHR

Ambiguity: Uses universalist language but empties it of meaning through Shari’ah restrictions.
Non-universality: Rights apply unequally across gender, religion, and belief.
Suppression of dissent: Freedom of speech and belief curtailed.
Gender inequality: Claimed equality undermined by patriarchal Shari’ah provisions.
Instrumentalization: Functions as an ideological weapon rather than a genuine charter of liberty.

9. Conclusion

The Universal Islamic Declaration of Human Rights (1981) was a landmark attempt to Islamize human rights discourse. While it mimics the UDHR in form, it diverges in essence. Its constant deferral to Shari’ah transforms rights from universal and inalienable into conditional and revocable.

By presenting itself as “universal,” it engages in a rhetorical sleight of hand. It reassures the world that Islam supports human rights, while simultaneously ensuring that those rights can never challenge religious orthodoxy. In practice, it has legitimized restrictions on freedom of religion, gender equality, and free expression in many Muslim-majority states.

The UIDHR is not merely a historical document; it remains a living symbol of the tension between universality and relativism. It highlights the enduring struggle: whether human rights belong to all humans equally, or whether they are subject to the dictates of particular traditions.

Until this tension is resolved, the UIDHR will stand as both a warning and a lesson—that human rights cloaked in religious exceptionalism are never truly universal.